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I. TIRODUCTION
During the 1980s, a new star emerged in seafood markets and restaurants
across the world. Driven by advanced technology and overfishing of shallow-
dwelling fish, commercial fishers in search of deeper-dwelling, marketable
species' discovered a relatively small, deep-ocean fish off the coast of New
Zealand.2 Brightly colored in orange and unusually ugly as fish go, this
"new" species was the orange roughy.3 Its taste was marvelous, it was low in
cholesterol, and easily adapted to nearly any pallet.4 Huge numbers were
harvested and shipped to markets around the globe.5 But then something
happened that many failed to imagine during the prosperity provided by the
orange roughy boom: commercial catches dramatically decreased.
6
In short, orange roughy abundance decreased because very little was
known about their life stages.7 Fisheries scientists later determined that they
are long-lived fish, often living as long as 120-150 years.8 Orange roughy do
I See Christopher C. Joyner, Compliance and Enforcement in New International
Fisheries Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 271,271-72 (1998).
2 Orange roughy are found worldwide, but are commercially exploited in the North
Atlantic and off the coasts of South Africa and Australia. Orange roughy generally are
harvested from depths of 750-1200 meters. See Malcolm R. Clark & Dianne M. Tracey,
Changes in a Population of Orange Roughy, Hoplostethus atlanticus, with Commercial
Exploitation on the Challenger Plateau, New Zealand, 92 FISHERY BULLETIN 236, 236
(1994); G.E. Fenton et al., Age Determination of Orange Roughy, Hoplostethus atlanticus
(Pisces: Trachichthyidae) Using ...Pb: 'Ra Disequilibria, 109 MARINE BIOLOGY 197,
197 (1991); David C. Smith et al., Age Determination and Growth of Orange Roughy
(Hoplostethus atlanticus): A Comparison of Annulus Counts with Radiometric Ageing, 52
CANADIAN J. OF FISHERIES & AQUATIC Sci. 391, 392 (1995); AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES
& FORESTRY-AUSTRALIA, ROUGHY-ORANGE, at http:llwww.affa.gov.au/docs/fisheries/
/names/namebook/p75a.html (Feb. 1, 1997) [hereinafter AFFA].
3 See AFFA, supra note 2, at http://www.affa.gov.au/docs/fisheries/namesl
namebook/p75a.html.
4See id.
5See id.
6 See id.; Clark & Tracey, supra note 2, at 236; Smith et al., supra note 2, at 392.
7 See Clark & Tracey, supra note 2, at 236; Smith et al., supra note 2, at 392; AFFA,
supra note 2, at http://www.affa.gov.au/docs/fisheries/names/namebooklp75a.html.
8 See Clark & Tracey, supra note 2, at 236; Fenton et al., supra note 2, at 197; Smith
et al., supra note 2, at 392; AFFA, supra note 2, at http:llwww.affa.gov.au/docs/
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not, however, reach reproductive capacity until about twenty to forty years 9,
at which time they are about the perfect size for a dinner plate. It was this
unfortunate combination that led to their rapid decline-slow to mature, slow
to grow, and thus slow to recover from fishing exploitation.10 In less than
twenty years, orange roughy stocks have been reduced to less than thirty
percent of their numbers during the early 1980s.II
Although in a considerably more time-compressed manner, the orange
roughy anecdote accurately depicts the fate of many of the world's
commercial fish species: harvested to or near collapse. Seventy percent of the
world's commercial marine fish species are either depleted or fully
exploited. 12 Since 1989, world population has increased about ten percent,
whereas the total harvest of marine fish has decreased nearly as much. 13
Thus, as the demand for fish increases in the face of decreasing supply, the
frequency and number of disputes also are likely to increase. The issues
underlying even a single-species fishery dispute are often complex, ranging
from legal issues, 14 biological issues, 15 and economics, 16 to politics. 17
fisheries/names/namebook/p75a.html.
9 See Fenton et al., supra note 2, at 201; Smith et al., supra note 2, at 392; AFFA,
supra note 2, at http:llwww.affa.gov.au/docs/fisheries/names/namebooklp75a.html.
10 See Fenton et al., supra note 2, at 201-02; Clark & Tracey, supra note 2, at 250-
51; AFFA, supra note 2, at http:llwww.affa.gov.au/docs/fisheries/names/nainebookp75a.
html. In other words, commercial fishers (and restaurants, for that matter) selected the
size at which orange roughy populations were most vulnerable. Notwithstanding that
fishers were blindly harvesting metric tonnes upon metric tonnes of these fish without
any knowledge of their total numbers, as a practical matter, harvesting fish before they
can reproduce thereby reducing their future populations clearly is not sound practice.
This is especially true for a fish that takes decades to reach the reproductive life stage.
See Fenton et al., supra note 2, at 202.
11 See Clark & Tracey, supra note 2, at 247; AFFA, supra note 2, at
http://www.affa.gov.au/docs/fisheries/names/namebook/p75a.html. Currently, fisheries
managers believe that they have a handle on orange roughy abundance and are regulating
their catches accordingly. See Clark & Tracey, supra note 2, at 247.
12 See C.J. Chivers, Empty Waves, Consider the Sea, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION,
Aug. 1998 (discussing how uncontrolled technology has contributed to the near
extinction of some fish populations).
13 See Brian J. Rothschild, How Bountiful Are Ocean Fisheries?, 2 CONSEQUENCES:
THE NATURE AND IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 15, 16 (1996).
14 E.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (July 25). This case
arose out of the "Cod Wars" of the 1970s during which Icelandic military vessels fired on
British and German fishing fleets that were fishing in an overfished cod fishery on the
high seas. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Environment and Security Concerns for Europe,
Institute of European Studies, Pub. No. 352, at 5, 8-9 (1996).
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Because any given fishery may be exploited by fishers representing a variety
of countries, nearly all existing or possible fisheries disputes arguably have
the potential to be world-wide in scope.
Even within a single country, fisheries disputes can be complex and may
ultimately be of international concern. For example, for more than a century
Columbia River salmon fisheries disputes in the United States have involved
Oregon and Washington state agencies, various federal agencies, several
Native American tribes, private interest groups, and of course, commercial
and sport fishing organizations. 18 Notwithstanding that significant numbers
of United States citizens in the northwest depend on the salmon fisheries for
their economic and cultural livelihoods, the piece-meal resolutions of those
disputes have been and remain of great concern to those international
commercial fishers who fish for Columbia River salmon at sea.1
9
Over the last two decades, the area over which countries assert control of
marine fisheries has dramatically increased. Following the less-than altruistic
lead of the United States in expanding its coastal fisheries jurisdiction to 200
miles,20 the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
15 E.g., biodiversity reductions, ecosystem imbalance, compensatory responses, etc.
Red flags indicating that a fishery is in trouble include: (1) decline in abundance of
fished-for species; (2) contraction of distribution or areas of high density; (3) changes in
the age structure or size structure, or both, with fewer older, larger fish and a population
dominated by younger, smaller fish; (4) an increase in growth rate, resulting in a decrease
in age for a given length; (5) lower age or smaller size at maturity, or both; and (6)
possible change in species composition over time. See Clark & Tracey, supra note 2, at
237-38.
16 E.g., increased unemployment and government subsidizing. See Joyner, supra
note 1, at 271 n.3 (citing World Wildlife Federation, The Rise and Fall of Modem
Fisheries, http://www.wwf.orglspecies/marinelfish32.html, at 1-2) (visited May 26,
1998).
17 E.g., the Turbot War between Canada and Spain. See Joyner, supra note 1, at 273;
see infra notes 99-124 and accompanying text;
18 See generally Timothy Weaver, Litigation and Negotiation: The History of
Salmon in the Columbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677 (1997) (discussing one
hundred years of litigation over Columbia River Fishing rights).
19 See id. Salmon are anadromous by nature; that is, they are spawned in the upper
reaches of their home river drainage, eventually migrate downstream to the ocean where
they grow and mature to the reproductive stage (two to five years), and then return to
their home river to move upstream and spawn, thus beginning the life cycle again. See id.
at 678 (citing Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434,437-38 (9th Cir.-1996)).
20 Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(A)
(1976), amended by Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Pub. L. No.
96-561, § 238, 94 Stat. 3299 (1980) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(A)
(1994)) [hereinafter Magnuson Act], amended by Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
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(UNCLOS) also expanded coastal states' offshore exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) to 200 miles. 21 It follows that states whose coastal fisheries are nearly
nonexistent 22 and send fishers great distances to satisfy commercial demands
will necessarily infringe upon coastal states seeking to conserve fisheries
within and beyond their EEZs.23 Thus, with countries asserting wider
jurisdiction, fisheries disputes are likely to be entangled with domestic and
international political issues.
Further confounding matters, fisheries administrators and managers
typically rely upon the research data provided by fisheries scientists, who in
turn gather their data from ecosystems that arguably are in an unpredictable
state of flux.24 When faced with no clear-cut scientific directives, a given
Conservation and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, §1 (a), 110 Stat. 3559 (1996)
(current version at 16 U.S.C.A § 1801(b)(1)(A) (West 2000) [hereinafter Magnuson-
Stevens Act]). The Magnuson Act expanded U.S. jurisdiction from 16 miles to 200 miles
off its coast as a "fishery conservation zone." Id. The intent of the U.S. was not to
preserve fisheries, but rather to prohibit other countries from exploiting an "American
natural resource." John M. Deitch et al., A Historical Perspective Leading Up To and
Including the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 51(1995) (citing Constance Sathre,
Salmon Interception on the High Seas: A Continuing Controversy Between The United
States And Japan, 16 ENvTL. L. 731, 733-35 (1986)).
21 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 55-57
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. Thus, the amount of area considered high seas was reduced by
about 40 percent, thereby heightening concerns about compliance with a given state's
management plans. See Joyner, supra note 1, at 271 (citing Wayne S. Ball, The Old Grey
Mare: National Enclosure of the Oceans, 27 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 97, 97-124 (1996))
(discussing the expansion of state jurisdiction into the high seas).
22 The European Union (EU), China, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Ukraine,
and Poland. See Joyner, supra note 1, at 273.
23 Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, and Indonesia
are those countries most concerned with maintaining substantial control of their coastal
fisheries. See Joyner, supra note 1, at 272-73. Decimation of traditional fisheries has led
many commercial fishers to travel greater distances, focusing their efforts off the coasts
of "African, Caribbean, and Pacific states." See Joyner, supra note 1, at 271.
24 Most fisheries management decisions are based on calculation of "maximum
sustainable yield" (MSY), which ideally estimates the maximum harvest rates without
under- or overfishing. See Paul A. Driver, International Fisheries, in THE MARrIME
DIMENSION 36 (R.P. Barston & Patricia Birnie eds., 1980). Additionally, year-class
strength (the number of offspring that recruit to the fishery) depends upon a complex
interaction of weather, timing, number of adults harvested, juveniles harvested as
bycatch, forage year-class strength, etc. See J.A. Gulland & L.K. Boerema, Scientific
Advice on Catch Levels, 71 FISHERIES BULLETIN 325, 325-35 (1973) (discussing the
problems of implementing MSY); see also Robert L. Demory & James T. Golden,
Sampling the Commercial Catch, FISHERIES TECHNIQUES 421, 429 (Larry A. Nielsen &
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state may be less likely to concede control over a fisheries dispute.25 In
addition to legal, biological, and political issues, fisheries disputes also often
arise among parties with distinct cultural views, which occasionally widen
the communication gap and may even unfetter deep-seated racism.26
Finally, because history has demonstrated that most contemporary
fisheries disputes are the result of stressed or collapsed fisheries, and because
fisheries continue to decline,27 nonbinding dispute resolution methods are
necessarily bound for failure because the result is a zero-sum gain.28 That is,
resolutions to disputes over who gets what piece of an ever-decreasing pie
aggravate the situation rather than actually settle it because, by "winning,"
disputants likely hasten the demise of the fishery. Thus, because fisheries
disputes by their very nature are complex and involve multilateral concerns,
their satisfactory resolutions are daunting tasks to say the least.
The rapid expansion of dispute resolution processes into both
international and U.S. domestic law has naturally led to their use in fisheries
disputes, as well as their incorporation into a number of fisheries agreements.
Nearly all dispute resolution techniques generally are used as tools in the
context of voluntary settlements.2 9 Thus, they oftentimes serve as the
foundation from which subsequent decisions, are made.30 Clearly, then, the
binding nature and enforcement of a resolved dispute will have a significant
effect on subsequent disputes over similar or related issues.
David L. Johnson eds., 4th ed. 1992) (discussing the appropriate sampling methods for
determining harvest rates); T. Williams, The Raw Material of Population Dynamics, FISH
POPULATION DYNAMICS 27, 27-45 (J. A. Gulland ed. 1977).
25 See A. Neil Craik, Recalcitrant Reality And Chosen Ideals: The Public Function
Of Dispute Settlement in International Environmental Law, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 551, 571-72 (1998).
2 6 See infra notes 125-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of racism in U.S.
fisheries disputes involving Native Americans.
2 7 See Dr. W. M. von Zharen, Ocean Ecosystem Stewardship, 23 WM. & MARY
ENVm. L. & POL'YREV. 1, 12-18 (1998).
28 That is, one country's or party's interest is necessarily opposed to the other's and
thus when one gains, the other loses. See Edith Brown Weiss, International
Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81
GEO. L.J. 675, 709 (1993).
29 See Gail Bingham, ADR Procedures: Variations on the Negotiation Theme, in
APPLYING ADR TECHNIQUES TO ENVIRONMENTAL MATERS, at 265, 267 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study Materials No. Feb. 11, 1998).
30 See id. In U.S. cases involving CERCLA Superfund allocation disputes, a neutral
party may provide an allocation report with non-binding recommendations. This report
may then become the basis for subsequent negotiations among the parties. See id.
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Dispute settlement mechanisms are commonly portrayed as existing
along a spectrum of party control and enforcement.31 Formal adjudication
represents the end of the spectrum where parties have little control, but
enforcement is maximized because the outcomes generally are binding on the
parties and on nonparties as legal precedence. Negotiation represents the
opposite end of the spectrum where parties have maximum control, but
relinquish their ability to effectively enforce agreements because the
outcomes generally are not binding or are only binding on the actual parties.
The most common dispute resolution processes used in fisheries disputes are
arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and negotiation.32  Arbitration,
conciliation, and mediation occur along the spectrum between adjudication
and negotiation. 33 Arbitration is described as "a private, voluntary,
adjudicative, and usually binding process established by mutual agreement of
the disputants to resolve existing or future disputes."'34 Conciliation also
involves a neutral third party, except that a conciliator or conciliation
commission, chosen by the disputants, typically examines the dispute and
makes a nonbinding recommendation as to the appropriate settlement. 35
Mediation essentially is an augmentation of negotiation in which a neutral
third party actively participates, though informally, to the extent that the third
party facilitates the transmittal of proposals and communications between the
disputants.3 6 Mediated settlements typically are only binding on the
disputants to the extent that the settlement agreement may be reviewed on the
basis of contract or treaty law.
Although multilateral negotiation has been the typical route taken for
fisheries dispute resolution in the past, recent developments suggest an
increasing willingness to submit environmental disputes to more formal,
legalistic processes. 37 The recent trend towards binding dispute settlement
indicates that states are increasingly concerned with enforcement and
31 See Craik, supra note 25, at 553.
32 In fact, these are the very dispute resolution processes which are specifically
embodied within UNCLOS. See UNCLOS, supra note 21, at pt. XV.
33 See Craik, supra note 25, at 553.
3 4 DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 28 (1999).
35 See id. at 105-06 (This is in contrast to the conciliation process used in the United
States whereby a conciliator generally does not make recommendations). See id.
36 See J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DIsPUTE SETrLEMENT 27 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991).
37 See Craik, supra note 25, at 552.
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compliance. However, the number of environmental treaties containing
compulsory and binding dispute settlement regimes remains very low. 38
Accordingly, the purpose of this Note is to examine how various entities
have incorporated the use of dispute resolution processes into the resolution
of fisheries disputes, as well as to explore the effectiveness of dispute
resolution processes in fisheries disputes. It maintains that dispute resolution
processes are not particularly effective in fisheries disputes without some
form of binding aspect that facilitates enforcement and compliance. First, the
disputants in fisheries disputes typically maintain significant politically- or
racially-entrenched positions, which amplify the need for one party to win at
the expense of the other. Thus, without a binding, enforceable decision, the
potential exists that a disputant that dislikes a particular outcome and
politically or racially disapproves of his or her counterpart may passionately
defy that outcome. Second, many fisheries management decisions are based
on scientifically imprecise and oftentimes conflicting information. Reliance
by disputants on information later proved to be inadequate not only
inevitably weakens agreements based upon such information, but also
strengthens scientifically-opposed positions--"my science is correct, yours is
wrong."'39 Third, disputes will increasingly arise over a fishery that is either
at or beyond the cusp of collapsing and thus nonbinding settlement of the
dispute may be a zero-sum gain. Recent trends in international fisheries law
suggest movement away from traditional negotiation and nonbinding dispute
resolution processes toward those that are binding. Finally, international
community pressure plays a critical role in the enforcement of fisheries
dispute resolutions.
To that end, Part II will examine the current status of international
fisheries law and the trend toward binding agreements, specifically
addressing UNCLOS, the Food and Agriculture Organization's Agreement to
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAQ Compliance
Agreement), and the subsequent 1995 U.N. Agreement for the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks (Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement). Finally, Part III will examine the
three characteristics of fisheries disputes that potentially preclude effective
use of nonbinding dispute resolution processes: political and racial issues,
scientific imprecision, and zero-sum gain.
38 See id. at 553.
39 An example of this mentality lead to the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (N.Z. v.
Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624 (1999). See infra notes 145-60 and
accompanying text.
797
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
II. THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES LAW: A TREND TOWARD
BINDING DISPUTE SETrLEMENT MECHANISMS AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMUNITY PRESSURE
The Charter of the United Nations requires participating states to settle
their disputes in a peaceful manner. 40 Neither reference to nor action in
accordance with legal procedures are required when settling disputes
between states.4 1 Furthermore, the Charter does not actually require states to
settle their disputes.42 To that end, the Charter includes traditional settlement
processes such as adjudication and arbitration, as well as negotiation,
mediation, inquiry, and conciliation. 43 Most states have elected to settle their
environmental disputes via dispute resolution processes such as negotiation,
mediation, and conciliation rather than relinquish the control that traditional
legal processes typically offer.44
Accordingly, over the last two decades, third-party involvement in
international dispute settlements has significantly increased. 45 Over that same
period, however, an increasing number of environmental cases have been
submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication. 46 This
phenomenon likely can be attributed to "community pressure"; 47 that is,
settlement of international environmental disputes concerns the broader
interests of the greater community, as well as the narrower interests of the
specific states involved in a dispute and thus disputing states can no longer
isolate their environmental dispute from outside interests.48
40 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(3); Craik, supra note 25, at 551.
41 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 708 (4th ed.
1990).
42 See Craik, supra note 25, at 551.
43 See U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
44 See Richard B. Bilder, The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the International
Law of the Environment, 144 RECuEILDEs CouRs 139, 224-26 (1975).
45 See Jonathan I. Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Dispute
Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69,
69 (1996).
46 See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Environmental Protection and the ICJ, in FIFTY YEARS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 295-315 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia
Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
47 Alan E. Boyle, Saving the World: Implementation and Enforcement of
International Environmental Law Through International Institutions, 3 J. ENVTL. L. 229,
230 (1991).
48 See Craik, supra note 25, at 553.
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With an emphasis on the need for international community pressure, this
section examines the UNCLOS dispute settlement regime, FAO Compliance
Agreement, and the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement and how these
agreements suggest a trend toward binding dispute settlement mechanisms
rather than traditional multilateral negotiations.
A. UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Regime
UNCLOS provides for a variety of dispute settlement avenues. Part XV
establishes the system for settling disputes regarding its interpretation and
application, including negotiation and conciliation.49 If the parties are unable
to resolve their dispute, a secondary, compulsory binding dispute settlement
system kicks in.50 At the time of signing, ratifying, or acceding to UNCLOS,
the compulsory system allows states to choose one or more of four dispute
settlement fora:51 (1) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), (2) the ICJ, (3) arbitration, and (4) special arbitration for fisheries,
marine environment, marine scientific research, and navigation disputes.52 In
the event that disputing states have not chosen any of the same settlement
fora, the dispute must be settled via compulsory arbitration.53 Because all of
the choices are either judge- or arbitrator-decided methods, the decisions are
characterized as binding on the parties.54
On the other hand, agreements made through negotiation, mediation, or
conciliation prior to the compulsory dispute settlement system are not
necessarily binding on the states.55 Herein lies the problem with traditional
dispute resolution processes under the auspices of UNCLOS: Is community
pressure enough to ensure enforcement and compliance of traditionally non-
binding dispute resolution decisions within the fisheries dispute context?
Though UNCLOS is still relatively new, indications are that community
49 See UNCLOS, supra note 21, at arts. 279-99, Annexes V-VIII.
50 See Charney, supra note 45, at 70.
51 See id. A list of experts must be maintained for disputes utilizing special
arbitration for fisheries, marine environment, marine scientific research, and navigation.
See id. at 70 n.10; see also UNCLOS, supra note 21, at Annex VI, art. 2.
52 See Charney, supra note 45, at n.10.
53 See id. at 70.
54 See UNCLOS, supra note 21, at art. 296; Charney, supra note 45, at 70. Whether
or not such processes actually are binding and enforceable is not within the scope of this
Note. This Author is of the opinion that, absent substantial international community
pressure, they are only binding in theory and are therefore unenforceable. See infra notes
53--65 and accompanying text.
55 See Craik, supra note 25, at 554.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
pressure may not be enough to maximize compliance in the fisheries dispute
context.56
The statutes of both the ICJ and ITLOS clearly stipulate that any decision
issued by these bodies is final and binding on the parties.57 However,
whereas the U.N. Security Council can take measures, including force, to
ensure that states comply with decisions of the ICJ,58 no comparable
enforcement power attaches to decisions of the ITLOS. 59 Moreover, the U.N.
Security Council has never actually applied the use of force provision, 60
despite failures by states to fulfill obligations imposed by the ICJ. Thus,
"[c]ommunity pressure remains in practice the only real sanction for
enforcing compliance with [arbitral] awards.... with judgments of the
[ICJ], ' ' 6 1 and for that matter, all nonbinding dispute settlement processes. 62
There is some evidence of reliance on community pressure for
compliance and enforcement within the UNCLOS statutes. The UNCLOS
conciliation process requires the publication of the findings and
recommendations of the conciliation commission.63 Hence, the UNCLOS
drafters likely recognized that, because international fisheries disputes have
underlying public concerns that outweigh private or domestic issues, it was
necessary to provide for publication of a conciliator's findings despite the
idea that confidentiality is typically viewed by states as an attractive attribute
of some dispute resolution processes. 64
What has become apparent then, is that the only truly binding mechanism
in the UNCLOS dispute settlement regime is public or international
community pressure. 65 In international law, even allegedly binding dispute
settlement mechanisms such as arbitration may be ignored when a state
disagrees with the decision. To illustrate, in the Beagle Channel dispute
56 See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
57 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 59 & 60, 1989 I.C.J. Acts &
Docs. 59, 83; UNCLOS, supra note 21, at Annex VI, art. 33.
58 See U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2. The UN Security Council has never actually
applied this provision, despite failures by states to fulfill obligations imposed by the ICJ.
See D.W.. Bowett, Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in the Settlement of
Disputes, 180 RECUEIL DEs CouRs 173, 177 (1983).
59 Craik, supra note 25, at 554.
60 See id. (citing Bowett, supra note 58, at 212).
61 Boyle, supra note 47, at 230.
62 See Craik, supra note 25, at 555.
63 See UNCLOS, supra note 21, at Annex V, art. 7.
64 See Craik, supra note 25, at 556-57.
65 See id. at 557.
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between Chile and Argentina,66 Argentina challenged the validity of the
arbitrators' decision on dubious grounds and, despite the implausibility of
Argentina's repudiation, the decision was never enforced. 67 In that dispute,
international community interest apparently was not substantial enough,
perhaps because the dispute was focused on the boundary islands between
Chile and Argentina.68 Thus, even though it was not decided under
UNCLOS, Argentina likely did not have to consider international community
pressure in deciding whether or not to comply. Under UNCLOS, there might
be strong domestic and international pressures to sign a. fishery agreement
regardless of the costs of compliance, but when the time for compliance
comes, narrower national interests may prevail. 69
B. Flag States v. Coastal States: The FAO Compliance Agreement
In spite of UNCLOS's intention to thoroughly address international
fisheries dispute settlement, a glaring weakness arose by the early 1990s.
States, were becoming acutely concerned over the lack of compliance with
international law regulating high seas fishing.70 Because UNCLOS extended
offshore EEZs to 200 miles,71 high seas fishing areas were reduced by forty
percent.72 Simultaneous declines in the world's fisheries and increases in
commercial fishing technologies escalated tensions over compliance with
international fishing rules to crisis levels.73 On the one hand, certain distant
66 See Beagle Channel Arbitration, 52 I.L.R. 93 (Brit. Ct. of Arb. 1977).
67 See MERRILLS, supra note 36, at 100; see also Declaration of Nullity, in Note
Delivered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina top the Ambassador of Chile
on Jan. 25, 1978, reprinted in RELACIONES CHILENO-ARGENTINAS: LA CONTROVERSIA
DEL CANAL BEAGLE, ALGUNOS DOCUMENTOS INFORMATIVOS 133, 139 (1978), translated
in 17 LL.M. 739 (1978).
68 See MERRILLS, supra note 36, at 100. The dispute was eventually settled via
mediation during which Chile used the arbitration decision as leverage against Argentina.
Argentina thus accepted the line equidistant between the two countries. See Sang-Myon
Rhee, Sea Boundary Delimitation Between States Before World War 1I, 76 AM. J. INT'L
L. 555, n.92 (1982).
69 See Joyner, supra note 1, at 276-77.
7 0 See id. at 271.
71 See UNCLOS, supra note 21, at arts. 55-57.
7 2 See Ball, supra note 21, at 98.
7 3 See generally Evelyne Meltzer, Global Overview of Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries, 25 OCEAN
DEv. & INT'L L. 255 (1994); Edward L. Miles & William T. Burke, Pressures on the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 Arising From New Fisheries
Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 343-50 (1989).
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water fishing nations (DWFNs) advocated the creation of narrow offshore
fishing zones with fewer restrictions. 74 On the other hand, most coastal states
that had viable fisheries were focused on conservation of those fisheries
within their respective EEZs, as well as broader conservation zones
offshore-the high seas.75
International law has long recognized the right to fish on the high seas.76
DWFNs are required, however, to comply with local fishing regulations.77
Because UNCLOS bestows sovereign rights and management authority to
coastal states over the living resources within their EEZs, and because most
living marine resources occur within EEZs, coastal states are saddled with
the obligation to conserve nearly all the world's living marine resources.78
UNCLOS also ensures the right of states to engage in fishing on the high
seas as long as DWFNs comply with treaty obligations, and the fundamental
obligation to cooperate in the conservation and management of high seas
resources.79 Moreover, flagged vessels typically are privately-owned and are
motivated by personal interests, not necessarily those of the state their flag
represents. Thus, because the interests of flagged vessels and their respective
states are not likely to be the same or even similar, serious confrontations are
inevitable.
Confounding the inevitability of disputes, fishing vessels that travel out
of their respective coastal zones to fish the high seas and within other states'
EEZs (coastal states) remain under the jurisdiction of their home state (flag
states). 80 Thus, the onus is on the flag states of DWFNs to regulate flagged
vessels from engaging in activities that contravene the effectiveness of
coastal states to conserve and manage their respective fisheries.81 During the
early 1990s, international concern regarding reflagging by private fishing
74 See Miles & Burke, supra note 73, at 343-50.
75 See Joyner, supra note 1, at 272.
7 6 See DOUGLAS JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 156-66 (1965).
77 See id.
78 See Joyner, supra note 1, at 277-78.
79 See id. at 283-95.
80 See Food and Agriculture Organization Agreement to Promote Compliance with
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High
Seas, 33 I.L.M. 969 (1994) [hereinafter FAO Compliance Agreement]. For a discussion
on the responsibilities of the flag states and the coastal states, see Joyner, supra note 1, at
283-92. In a nutshell, flag and coastal states must exchange information regarding
regulations, number of vessels, etc. in order to avoid disputes. See id.
81 See Joyner, supra note 1, at 285.
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vessels sharply increased. 82 Thus, in 1992, the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) promulgated Agenda 21, which
specifically addressed the reflagging issue.83 The following year, the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) adopted its FAO Compliance
Agreement. 84
The FAQ Compliance Agreement continues to rely on flag state
responsibility as the major mechanism for compliance by fishing vessels on
the high seas.85 Flag states are responsible for licensing its flagged fishing
vessels86 and maintaining records of authorized vessels. 87 Coastal states are
authorized to investigate fishing vessels to determine whether violations have
occurred. 88 Thus, the record-keeping regime under the FAO Compliance
Agreement was intended to facilitate control and supervision of vessels by
both flag and coastal states.89
As the world's fisheries continued to dwindle, both coastal and flag
states began to recognize the importance of compliance. Significantly, the
success of the FAQ Compliance Agreement turns on how much weight flag
states give their domestic interests when balancing them against international
interests. This in turn depends on the enforceability of the FAO Compliance
Agreement with respect to the particular dispute mechanisms available. 90
Again, international community pressure appears to be the best means of
enforcement in this situation; without it, experience reveals that short-sighted
private and domestic concerns generally win out when push comes to
shove. 91
82 See id. at 282-83. Reflagging is when vessel operators change their ship's flags to
thos& of non-parties to regional fishing agreements or treaties in order to circumvent
complying with the conservation or management regimes encapsulated within the
agreements or treaties. See id. at n.57.
83 See Chs. 17 & 17.52, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (1992).
84 See FAQ Compliance Agreement, supra note 80.
85 See id. at art. III.
86 See id.
87 See id. at art. IV.
88 See id. at art. V.
89 See id. at art. IV.
90 See Phillipe Sands, Compliance with International Environmental Obligations:
Existing International Legal Arrangements, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENViRONMENTALLAW 48, 52-56 (James Cameron et al. eds., 1996).
91 See infra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
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C. 1995 U.N. Agreement for the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
Efforts to ratify a more comprehensive agreement delineating the
responsibilities of flag and coastal states have not yet succeeded.92 Thus,
states, especially flag states, likely are reluctant to concede jurisdiction over
their fishing vessels. Without authoritative enforcement mechanisms,
compliance can only be ensured through political pressure. 93 The lack of
specific provisions delineating the rights and duties of flag and coastal states
inhibited enforcement and implementation of conservation measures, thus
increasing tension among the two factions. 94 The Straddling Fish Stocks
Agreement specifically addressed these issues: 95
Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and
those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in
order to ensure conservation and management of the straddling fish
stocks... in their entirety. To this end, coastal states and states fishing on
the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving
compatible measures in respect of such stocks. 96
The Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement further provides that "any of the
states concerned" may resort to compulsory, binding dispute settlement.97
Although the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement has yet to be ratified by
the requisite number of states, the upshot is that the participating states
recognized that compliance and enforcement of fisheries regulations can only
92 As of May 1998, only ten states had even accepted the agreement.
See Joyner, supra note 1, at n.63 (citing http:llwww.fao.orgIWAICENTIFAOINFO/
FISHERY/agreem/compliantab. 1.htm (visited on May 22, 1998).
93 See Joyner, supra note 1, at 287.
94 See id. at 289.
95 See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 Dec. 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N.
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks & Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 6th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.164/37 (1995) [hereinafter Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement]. Straddling
fish stocks are populations of fish that occur or move between an EEZ of at least one
coastal state and at least one adjacent high-seas zone. Marian Nash Leigh, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 90 A.J.I.L. 270, 271 (1996).
Highly migratory fish stocks are populations that migrate through both the high seas and
coastal states' EEZs. Id.
96 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 95, at art. 7.
97 Id.
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be achieved via dispute settlement mechanisms that are binding in nature. In
addition, one may go so far as to suggest that the Straddling Fish Stocks
Agreement has become customary international law. Rather than depend
upon flag states to balance domestic against international concerns,
investigations and judicial proceedings under the Straddling Fish Stocks
Agreement require sanctions that are "adequate in severity to be effective in
securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and
shall deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal
activities. '98 Thus, the nonbinding, less formalistic dispute resolution
processes such as mediation and conciliation would otherwise require
substantial political pressure in order to have any enforcement capabilities,
thereby rendering them unsuitable in the fisheries dispute context.
IIl. CHARACTERISTICS OF FISHERIES DISPuTES THAT PREVENT
EFFECTIVE USE OF NONBINDING DIsPum RESOLUTION PROCESSES
To illustrate the issues that result in the unsuitability of nonbinding
dispute resolution processes in the fisheries disputes context, it is useful to
examine recent, though long-time-coming fisheries disputes. Accordingly,
this section examines the dispute between Canada and Spain and Native
American fisheries disputes within the United States with a view toward
elucidating the inflexible political and racial positioning that renders most
dispute resolution techniques ineffective. This section will further briefly
examine the scientific imprecision and zero-sum gain characteristics that also
affect the suitability of nonbinding dispute resolution techniques in fisheries
disputes.
A. Politically- and Racially-Entrenched Disputes
1. The Turbot War: Canada v. Spain
At one time Canada enjoyed plentiful coastal fisheries. When John Cabot
first arrived in Canadian waters in 1497, his crew could hardly row through
the masses of cod schools.99 From the early 1980s through 1994, however,
cod harvests crashed to all-time lows, forcing the Canadian government to
impose a seven-year moratorium on cod fishing, and also banning cod
fishing off Newfoundland's Grand Banks. 100 The demise of the cod fishery
98 Id. at art. 19, para. 2.
99 See Deitch et al., supra note 20, at 67-68.
100 See id. at 68-69.
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eventually left some 30,000 fishers and plant workers unemployed.10 1 In
Newfoundland alone, the demise of the cod fishery was responsible for
eighty percent unemployment, forcing the government to subsidize thousands
of households and to finance programs to encourage fishers to seek
alternative livelihoods.102
Even though Canadian fishers significantly contributed to the cod fishery
crash, it is no wonder that such far-reaching implications could conjure up an
extremely adversarial, racially-entrenched position on the part of any state
suffering similar devastation. Fearing an analogous crash of the turbot
fishery, the Canadian government persuaded the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization (NAFO) to reduce by half the allowable commercial catch of
turbot.103
Spearheaded by Spain, the European Union (EU) opposed the NAFO
turbot quotas. 10 4 Spain, which has the largest fishing fleet in the EU, is
notorious among fisheries communities for its over-aggressive fishing
practices and consequently has been banned from European, Moroccan, and
Namibian waters. 105 A number of negotiation attempts were made by NAFO
members to determine mutually acceptable turbot quotas, but all failed
because the EU demanded quotas five times greater than those proposed by
Canada in order to accommodate the large Spanish and Portuguese fishing
fleets.106 Canada responded by formally prohibiting Spanish and Portuguese
vessels from entering international waters around Grand Banks.107
Spanish fishing vessels ignored Canada's declarations and continued to
fish in and around Newfoundland's Grand Banks. 10 8 As a result, Canadian
warships chased and captured the Spanish fishing vessel "Estai,"
subsequently arresting the crew and impounding the vessel. 10 9 The Canadian
government maintained that the Estai had violated a number of Canadian
101 See id. at 70.
102 See id.
103 See Andrew Schaefer, 1995 Canada-Spain Fishing Dispute (The Turbot War), 8
GEO. INT'LENVTL. L. REv.437, 438 (1996).
104 See J. Alan Beesley & Malcolm Rowe, Why Canada Was Right in the Turbot
War, VANCOUVER SUN, May 24, 1995, at A15.
105 See Schaefer, supra note 103, at 439.
106 Beesley & Rowe, supra note 104, at A15.
107 Id. Canada maintained that Spain and Portugal had already exceeded their turbot
quota by that time. Id.
108 Schaefer, supra note 103, at 440.
109 Id.
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Coastal Fisheries Protection Act1 0 provisions regarding net mesh size and
minimum length restrictions for turbot harvests.111 Contrary to Canada's
claims, however, the NAFO regulations at the time had not been violated by
the Estai's crew. 1 12 Furthermore, UNCLOS provides that a flagship is subject
only to the jurisdiction of the state whose flag it flies.1 13 Thus, under
international law at the time, only Spain could force the Estai to comply with
Canada's domestic fisheries regulations, which of course it was not likely to
do. I,
Amid efforts to negotiate a settlement, relations further deteriorated.
After Canadian officials interfered with another Spanish fishing vessel, Spain
sent two military patrol vessels to the area and began requiring Canadians
traveling in Spain to carry a visa.114 Negotiations between Canadian and EU
representatives, likely coupled with the threat of force on behalf of both
parties, eventually resulted in an agreement requiring, inter alia, a reduction
in EU turbot quotas-albeit not nearly as reduced as those proposed by
Canada-suspension of Canadian authority beyond its EEZ, an independent
observer on board flag ships, and more rigid measures for enforcing
management plans.1 15 However, under the settlement agreement, jurisdiction
over the fishing vessels still remained with the flag states.
The EU subsequently exhibited its commitment to the agreement when
they ordered a Spanish fishing vessel to return to Spain after determining that
the crew had been using illegal nets. 116 Other EU members, however, were
skeptical about Spain's commitment to the agreement due to Spain's
substantial fishing fleet and high unemployment at the time.1 17 Moreover, the
terms of the agreement eventually led to the Straddling Fish Stocks
Conference, although it has yet to be officially ratified.118 Thus, even though
110 Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C., ch. C-33 (1985) (Can.).
111 Id. at 441.
112 Schaefer, supra note 103, at 441 (citing Paul Koring, Allegations Concerning
Spanish Trawler are Unfounded or Misrepresent Legal Practice, Inspector Says, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Canada), Apr. 1, 1995, at 7).
113 UNCLOS, supra note 21, at art. 92(1).
114 Schaefer, supra note 103, at 442.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 O'Connell, supra note 14, at 9. Specifically, German newspapers reflected the
skepticism about Spain's commitment. With the highest number of fishers per capita in
the EU and 20 percent unemployment, Spain's interest in fulfilling its obligations were
low to say the least, and thus the likelihood of more conflict was high. Id.
118 Schaefer, supra note 103, at 443; see also Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement,
supra note 96.
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there may be reason for "cautious optimism," 1" 9 coastal states remain at the
mercy of flag states to enforce arguably nonbinding agreements. Traditional
political avenues in dispute resolution filled the gaps that UNCLOS failed to
address. The international community responded by promulgating the
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement and including within it more rigorous
enforceability, thus continuing the trend toward binding dispute settlement
techniques.
Given the on again, off again nature of politically-laden disputes and the
potential for racially-entrenched positions regarding fisheries disputes
evidenced by the Canadian example, the suitability of typically nonbinding
dispute resolution decisions is questionable at best. Notwithstanding
UNCLOS, it is generally accepted in international fisheries law that disputes
are settled via multilateral negotiations. 120 However, negotiations about the
issues relevant to the Turbot War had been ongoing for many years without
settlement. 121 Overfishing in the Grand Banks region continued throughout
the negotiations, thus inflicting greater damage on Canada because it was the
only state that prohibited its fishing fleet from harvesting in the region. 122
Even though they were EU members, British fishers vigorously supported
Canada's position in the Turbot War because it contributed to the escalation
of fisheries disputes as an international political priority.123 Enforcement of
international agreements not subject to adjudication had been missing up to
the point that drove Canada to take aggressive action outside of its EEZ.124 In
all likelihood, England's support of the Canadian position created enough
international community pressure to move the disputants toward settlement.
The end result of the Turbot War is that, by necessity, it is now accepted that
fishing outside the EEZ should be governed by compulsory arbitration or
119 News Release, Dep't of Fisheries & Oceans, Tobin Welcomes E.U. Action
Against Spanish Vessel (May 9, 1995), at http:llwww.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/newsrell
1995/HQ47E.htm.
120 Schaefer, supra note 103, at 446.
121 Id.
122 Id. (citing Alison Reiser, Reports of ASIL Program: ASIL Observer Comments
on UN Conference on Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks, ASIL NEWSLE1TER (Am.
Soc'y of Int'l Law, Wash., D.C., Nov. 1993).
123 An Invaluable Treaty, OITAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 5, 1995, at B6.
124 Schaefer, supra note 103, at 446-47 (citing Benjamin V. Ferencz, The New
International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond, 89 A.C.I.L. 674, 676 (1995)
(book review)).
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adjudication and thus binding, enforceable decisions. 125 To what extent this
will inhibit further abuses by flagged vessels remains to be seen.
2. Native American Fisheries Disputes in the United States
Nowhere are politically- and racially-entrenched positions more clearly
illustrated than by those fisheries disputes in the U.S. involving Native
Americans: Thousands of hours have been spent litigating treaty rights and
negotiating agreements only to return to the same issues all over again. Many
Native American-federal government treaties are still in force.126 Because
nonnative expansion has encroached upon traditional tribal lands, the
allocation of resources under treaties is an oft-occurring problem. 127 In the
face of the ever-decreasing resources that historically form the foundation for
their respective cultures, Native Americans battle against both legal and
racist barriers.
Over one hundred and forty years ago, the U.S. government signed
several treaties with Pacific Northwest Native American tribes. 128 Specific
language in the text of the treaties guaranteed to the tribes the "'the right to
take fish in common with' [white settlers] 'at all unusual and accustomed
places." 129 This right concerned and resulted in a myriad of disputes and
lawsuits over the region's numerous salmon fisheries.130 The results of the
many lawsuits are that that the tribes have property rights to their historic
fishing grounds, they are insulated from state license fees, they are
guaranteed one-half the harvestable fish, including those fish produced from
federal and state hatcheries, and, most importantly, they are ostensibly
protected from discriminatory regulation. 131
125 John R. Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman,' The Future of the' United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 488, 498 (1994).
126 Eric Eisenstadt, Fish Out Of Water: Setting A Single Standard For Allocation Of
Treaty Resources, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 209, 209 (1992).
127 Id.
128 Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and
Habitat Protection In The Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO.
L. REV. 407, 409 (1998).
129 Id. (citing Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, U.S.-Nisquallys-Puyallups,
art. 3, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133; Treaty with the Nez Perces, June 11, 1855, U.S.-Nez Perces,
art. 3, 12 Stat. 957, 958).
130 Blumni & Swift, supra note 128, at 409.
131 For property rights, see United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381, 384 (1905)
(stating that the tribes were entitled to a servitude,.a right in land, and an easement to
those areas located off the reservation). See also Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391
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But for every legal decision promulgated, yet another dispute arose.
Much of the political positioning in Native American fisheries disputes
appears to be related to states' reluctance to commonage the fisheries with
tribal governments.' 32 The United States Supreme Court had validated
Columbia River tribal rights under the treaties.1 33 Upon remand from the
Court, a district court held that Oregon and Washington must cease
managing the fishery as they had done, which limited the number of salmon
that made it upstream to tribal fishing grounds to few or none at all. 134
Despite the legal precedent and the nearly one hundred years of litigation,
however, the disputes continued to fester and spawned continuous
litigation 135  because the state governments continued to delay
implementation to the detriment of the Native Americans.' 36 Thus, whereas
the federal government generally advanced Native American claims, state
courts and their respective governments maintained positions that were
"openly hostile" to the Native Americans. 137
Notwithstanding political posturing among disputants, fisheries disputes
frequently include elements of racism. Canada's singling out of Spanish
fishing vessels in the Turbot War arguably can be traced back to some degree
of racism towards Spanish fishers and their poor reputation for following the
rules.138 Likewise, the Columbia River salmon fishery dispute entailed deep-
seeded racism as illustrated by the following passage from Washington State
Supreme Court Justice Bausman:
The premise of Indian sovereignty we reject. The treaty is not to be
interpreted in that light. At no time did our ancestors, in getting to this
continent, ever regard the aborigines as other than mere occupants, and
incompetent occupants, of the soil .... Only that title was esteemed which
came from white men .... These [treaties] were but the announcement of
U.S. 392 (1968); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919); United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974).
132 Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel The Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing
Rights of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WIs. L. REv. 375, 409.
133 Tulee, 315 U.S. at 685; Seufert Bros., 249 U.S. at 198-99; Winans, 198 U.S. at
381.
134 Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911 (D. Or. 1969).
135 Weaver, supra note 18, at 681.
13 6 FAY G. COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL: THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER
NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS 122-23 (1986).
137 Eisenstadt, supra note 126, at n.73.
138 Schaefer, supra note 103, at 439.
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our benevolence which, notwithstanding our frequent frailties, has been
continuously displayed. Neither Rome nor sagacious Britain ever dealt
more liberally with their subject races than we with these savage tribes,
whom it was generally tempting and always easy to destroy, and whom we
have so often permitted to squander vast areas of fertile land before our
eyes. 139
Some seventy years later, hostility, violence, and vandalism against
Native American fishing gear continued, 140 some of which remains to this
day. 14 1 Thus, even in the face of decades of legal and allegedly binding
precedence, the Columbia River salmon fishery dispute persists.
Other Native American fisheries disputes have followed the same long-
term litigation path in other parts of the United States.142 In Wisconsin, local
opposition to Native American fisheries rights run "bitter and deep."'143 At
one time, the best selling brand of beer in Northern Wisconsin was "Treaty
Beer," which was produced to raise revenue to oppose Chippewa treaty
rights to fishing areas. 144 The dispute inWisconsin instigated racial epithets,
interference with Native American fishing, and even physical assault of
many Native American fishers. 14 5 Although years of litigation has provided
the legal precedence to minimize further litigation in both the Columbia
River 146 and Wisconsin examples, 147 the likelihood that court decisions will
"resolve the social unrest that runs so deep" is not very good.148 Clearly, this
does not bode well for binding international decisions under the auspices of
the ICI or ITLOS, neither of which provides substantial legal precedence
with respect to fisheries disputes.
139 State v. Towessnute, 154 P. 805, 807 (Wash. 1916).
140 H.R. REP. No. 96-1243, pt. 2, at 26 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6793, 6808.
141 See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that
"the history set forth in the Puyallup and Antoine cases, among others, make it crystal
clear that it has been recalcitrance of Washington State officials (and their vocal non-
Indian commercial and sports fishing allies) which produced the denial of Indian rights
requiring intervention by the district court. This responsibility should neither escape
notice nor be forgotten") (Bums, J., concurring); Eisenstadt, supra note 126, at n.73.
142 Wilkinson, supra note 132, at 393-98.
143 Id. at 376.
144 Id.
145Id.
146 Id. at 406-07.
147 Id. at 404.
148 Id. at 403.
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Moreover, even though Native Americans proved to be staunch
defenders of the Columbia River salmon, recent government funding via
Senate Bill 5595, intended to address the dire situation without any long-term
funding, does not allocate one cent to any of the tribes.149 Thus, political, and
perhaps racial positioning continues to sabotage any real hope of resolving
the dispute, even in the face of allegedly binding legal decisions because
salmon restoration lacks regulatory certainty. 150 Clearly, the political and
moral positioning illustrated by these examples affected the parties" ability to
effectively communicate, perhaps even instigating the disputes in the first
place.
B. Scientific Imprecision
It is clear that science plays a significant role in contemporary fisheries
disputes because much of fisheries management relies on the compilation,
analyses, and exchange of scientific data. Unfortunately, the data neither
provide all the answers nor even all the correct answers. Thus, using
imprecise scientific foundations upon which to base management decisions
may lead to future disputes if the scientific reasoning driving those decisions
does not play out as interpreted.
Scientific imprecision in the context of this Note does not mean poor or
faulty science (although that may well be the case in years long-since
passed). Rather, scientific imprecision is intended to describe the inability to
measure all relevant factors, past, present, and future, in any given fishery
ecosystem-a nearly impossible task. Scientific imprecision also includes
variability, both within the sampling or collecting of the data and within the
approaches taken by different scientists. Consequently, what might appear to
be a bumper harvest of fish one year may well turn out to be the beginning of
the end, 151 as was potentially the case with the orange roughy.
14 9 William H. Rodgers, Jr., What A Salmon Czar Might Hope For, 74 WASH. L.
REv. 511, 514 (1999).
150 Id. at 516.
151 For example, fisheries managers might use a previous year's total catch in a
given fishery to determine the following year's catch quotas. The fisheries managers
might make a number of assumptions, such as a 30% underreporting of actual landings,
before promulgating a catch quota. If by chance the year used as the baseline for the
calculation happened to be an exceptional year for whatever reasons (e.g., a nutrient-rich
upwelling closer to the coast than normal), the catch quota may ultimately overestimate
abundance and thus drive the fishery toward over-harvest. E.g., N. Carolina Fisheries
Ass'n, Inc. v. Daley, 27 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. Va. 1998) (discussing how fishery
management plans are determined in an action in which local commercial fishers and the
[Vol. 16:3 2001]
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Scientific imprecision frequently is the focus of many international and
national fisheries disputes. In only the third case to reach ITLOS, the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, New Zealand and Australia sought
adjudication against Japan for what they alleged were violations of UNCLOS
Articles 64 and 116-119 regarding the conservation and management of
southern bluefin tuna (SBT) stocks. 152 The parties had failed to reach
agreement via negotiations regarding an experimental fishing program (EFP)
and total allowable catch (TAC). 153 Although the case was far more complex
than what will be addressed here, the dispute arose because there was
scientific uncertainty regarding allowable catch, conservation, and
sustainable yield of SBT.154 The respective scientists could not agree upon
which data were reliable. Hence, each party maintained a "my science is
correct, yours is wrong" position.
ITLOS acknowledged the scientific uncertainty 155 and ordered the
parties (1) to avoid aggravation of the dispute; (2) to reasonably carry out the
decision; (3) to set TAC at levels last agreed upon by the disputants; (4) to
refrain from an EFP unless the disputants mutually agree upon one; (5) to
resume negotiations in order to reach agreement on conservation and
management measures of SBT; and (6) make additional efforts to reach
agreements with other states regarding conservation and management of
SBT.156 Although ITLOS provided interim measures until agreements could
be made, 157 the decision merely ordered the parties to respect the existing
TAC and for Japan to cease its EFP. Nothing about the scientific uncertainty
was resolved, although the dispute did proceed to arbitration. 158 The
arbitration panel subsequently nullified the interim measures by agreeing
state fisheries association sued the Secretary of Commerce challenging a 1997 summer
flounder quota).
152 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624,
1627-29 (1999).
153 Although Japan averred that New Zealand and Australia failed to exhaust
procedures for amicable dispute settlement under Part XV, section 1 of UNCLOS and
requested a provisional measure requiring both to recommence negotiations. S. Bluefin
Tuna, 38 LL.M. at 1630, 1633.
154 Id. at 1634.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1635-36.
157 Id. at 1635.
158 See id. at 1634.
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with Japan's contention that ITLOS did not have jurisdiction. 159 The parties
eventually agreed to jointly fish the region for research purposes until 2003,
subject to details to be determined by third-party scientific experts. 160 Japan
has since used the agreement as leverage against New Zealand to induce
them to lift a similar Japanese whaling ban. 161 Thus, an allegedly binding
decision by ITLOS was later rejected by an arbitration panel, leaving the
parties to return to square one and negotiate a settlement. Because tensions
continue to fester among the parties,162 in all likelihood, the dispute will not
be resolved until science comes to some sort of consensus regarding the
plight of the SBT.
In the Columbia River fisheries disputes, failure of the salmon fishery
was not only attributable to, inter alia, habitat degradation, but also to the fact
that scientists failed to consider simultaneously managing the ocean salmon
fisheries. 163 Thus, not all the relevant data were considered when making
management decisions. Moreover, failure to recognize the need for more
precise science continues to be an obstacle in the Columbia River fisheries
disputes. Recently, the Washington legislature in Senate Bill 5595 failed to
clearly define the role of science in salmon recovery. 164 The bill spreads
scientific responsibility among several technical groups. 165 Thus, there is a
strong possibility that future disputants will take the " my science is correct,
yours is wrong" position absent any clearly delineated scientific authority.
United States Atlantic Coast fisheries disputes also often are based on a
lack of agreement over whose scientists are correct. In Tutein v. Daley,166
commercial fishers sued the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, 167 challenging the
validity of the Secretary's declaration that the Atlantic bluefin tuna (ABT)
159 Japan to Conduct Joint Tuna Research With Australia, N.Z, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 27, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Wire Services Stories
File.
160 Id.
161 Jonathan Milne, Tuna Pact Stirs Other Tensions, DOMINION, Dec. 26, 2000, at 2.
162 Id.
163 Weaver, supra note 18, at 681.
164 Rodgers, supra note 149, at 517.
165 Id.
166 Tutein v. Daley, 43 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D. Mass. 1999).
167 Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (a.k.a.
the Sustainable Fisheries Act), the Secretary of Commerce has the exclusive authority to
implement fishery management plans (FMP). 16 U.S.C. § 1855(d) (1994).
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was overfished. 168 Among the fishers' contentions was that using stock size
rather than fishing mortality rate to determine whether or not a fishery is
overfished was arbitrary and capricious. 169 The court dismissed this
argument for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,170 but the upshot is that,
faced with a dwindling ABT fishery, the commercial fishers tried to fight the
impending reduced catch quotas by pitting one scientific view against
another.
In Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley,171 a similar overfishing
dispute regarding cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder stocks in the
northeastern U.S., an organized group of commercial fishers contended that
maintaining the "status quo" would sufficiently rebuild the fisheries at issue,
contrary to the Secretary's decision.172 The court rejected the argument,
holding that, inter alia, "[w]hen an agency is faced with conflicting scientific
views and chooses among them," a court should defer to the agency's
scientific expertise. 173 In contrast, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases
ITLOS provided interim measures, but left the final decision to the parties
through continued negotiations, 174 the very process that brought them before
ITLOS in the first place. Whether the U.S. approach is the better one is
debatable, but at a minimum, the U.S. approach moves forward, rather than
back to square one. Moreover, the U.S. approach attempts to ensure
compliance by using the U.S. Coast Guard to enforce the Magnuson-Stevens
Act.175
Irrespective of which is the correct approach, the majority of
international, regional, and national fisheries legal regimes have thus far
proven to be ineffective in slowing the reduction of commercial fish
stocks.176 Moreover, attempting to resolve fisheries disputes by choosing one
disputant's science over another's in all likelihood will not end the dispute
there. Thus, those responsible for making scientific recommendations upon
168 "Overfished" means that a particular fish species is being harvested at a rate or
level of fishing mortality that threatens the capacity of a given fishery to provide MSY on
a continuing basis. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(29) (Supp. H 1996).
169 Tutein, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 116.
170 See id. at 125.
171 Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104 (lst Cir. 1997).
172 See Associated Fisheries, 127 F.3d at 109-10.
173 Id. at 110 (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).
174 S. Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624, 1630-35
(1999).
175 See 16 U.S.C. § 1826(g) (Supp. 11 1996).
176 Von Zharen, supra note 27, at 1.
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which fisheries managers rely must be independent and composed of neutral
members in order to maximize the use of current and relevant scientific
information in the decision-making process. 177 Finally, the methods and
results must also be subject to scrutiny by the scientific community and the
public in general in order to properly determine the feasibility of fisheries
agreements or dispute resolutions from both private and public
perspectives. 178
C. Zero-Sum Gain or a Smaller Piece of the Pie for All:
Fewer and Fewer Fish to Fight Over
The right to harvest fish that do not exist means nothing.
Notwithstanding the political, moral, and scientific obstacles, declines in
much of the world's fisheries will inevitably create more and more fisheries
disputes. Food harvested from the sea is the primary source of protein for
about half the world's population. 179 Strikingly, seventy percent of the
world's commercial marine fish species are either depleted or fully
exploited. 180 As fewer and fewer fish are allocated to potential disputants,
inflexible positioning is likely to set in. Thus, no amount of litigation or
mediation or negotiation will solve future fisheries disputes when there are
only a few fish over which to fight.
Nearly all of the early litigation regarding the Columbia River salmon
fishery dealt with access to or allocation of the, salmon among the various
non-Native American groups and the tribal governments with treaty rights.18'
Very little, if any effort was directed towards the demise of the Columbia
River salmon and steelhead and their respective habitats.182 Thus, at present,
most of the Columbia River salmon upon which the Native Americans relied
as the foundation of their culture are either gone, on the Endangered Species
list, are threatened species, or are nearing similar fates. 183
177 Craik, supra note 25, at 572.
178 Id.
1 7 9 Von Zharen, supra note 27, at 5 (citing NAT'L ROUND TABLE ON THE
ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY, SUSTAINABLE STRATEGIES FOR OCEANS: A Co-
MANAGEMENT GUIDE 2 (1998)).
180 Chivers, supra note 12.
181 Weaver, supra note 18, at 678.
182 Id. at 678-79.
183 See generally Rodgers, supra note 149.
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In the Wisconsin fisheries dispute, the fish species at issue were not on
the edge of collapse or even close, for that matter.184 However, because fish
production was down in some Wisconsin fisheries due to pollution and
habitat degradation, 185 non-Native American constituents likely blamed the
Native American fishers for decreased production and also likely feared that
the trend would continue downward. It is not at all implausible that the
political and racial rifts between the disputants is driving this mentality, but
the need to maintain the fisheries, at least at sustainable levels, also likely
drives this mentality. Similarly, the experience that the Canadians had with
the collapse of their cod fisheries likely drove them to their threat of force in
the Turbot War. Thus, much of the veracity and passion that fueled these
disputes was the obvious fear that one day there will be no more turbot, no
more salmon, or no more SBT.
Because many fisheries disputes involve fish species that have collapsed
or are at the brink of collapsing, 186 winners ultimately become losers and
thus the result is a zero-sum gain. For example, if the commercial fishers in
Associated Fisheries had won their suit against the Secretary of Commerce,
groundfish quotas would have remained the same. 187 Although the fishers
would have preserved their ability to maintain their level of income for the
short term, in all likelihood, the critical state of the fisheries would have been
hastened, potentially to a point of no return, thereby jeopardizing the fishers'
livelihood for the long term. Thus, -when faced with collapsing or near
collapsing fisheries, those individuals making fisheries management
decisions, whether in a judicial, ADR, or agency context, must be able to
balance the adverse economic impacts on the fishers against the moral or
legal obligation to eliminate overfishing and preserve commercial fish
stocks. 188
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the last few decades, a noticeable trend in international
environmental law is movement away from a state-centered orientation of the
184 Wilkinson, supra note 132, at 376-78.
185 Id. at 378.
186 All of the disputes in this Note, except for the Wisconsin Native American
dispute, involved fisheries in such a position.
187 Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109-10 (1st Cir.
1997).
188 This is purportedly one of the methods used by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce
when determining the acceptability of FMPs. See id. at 108, 118.
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earth's environment toward a more world-wide perspective 189 in which states
are expected "to act inside the limits of their jurisdiction on behalf of the
interests of mankind." 190 Thus, dispute settlement mechanisms in domestic
and international environmental law should serve both private and public
interests, particularly regarding resource allocation, protection, and
preservation. 19 1
What is clear from the Turbot War, the Native American fisheries
disputes in the United States, and the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases is that
history tends to repeat itself. Thus, the success of any fisheries dispute
resolution mechanism will be determined by three important factors. 192 First,
the intensity of the political and racial positioning. Second, the status of the
science from which positions are established; that is, to what extent the
science is widely accepted by both the scientific community and the general
public. Third, the status of the fishery at the onset of the dispute-are there
fish to fight over? Future fisheries dispute resolution mechanisms must
account for these factors and overcome them with strong enforcement and
regulatory measures if there are to be any fish left for the future. Finally,
domestic and international community pressure is imperative if there is to be
any hope of enforcement without the use of force.
189 Craik, supra note 25, at 564.
190 Alexandre Kiss, Introduction to EDITH BROWN WEISS, ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS 13-14 (Edith
Brown Weiss ed., 1992).
191 Craik, supra note 25, at 564-65.
192 These factors are not limited to fisheries disputes. See Jonathan Brock, Mandated
Mediation: A Contradiction in Terms, Lessons From Recent Attempts to Institutionalize
Alternative Dispute Resolution Practices, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 59 (1991).
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